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THE VIRTUES (AND LIMITS) OF
SHARED VALUES: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT AND MIRANDA'S
CONCEPT OF CUSTODY
Richard A. Williamson*

Miranda only protects suspects who the police subject to custodial
interrogation. The concept of custody is tethered to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; thus, to render a suspect in
custody, law enforcement officials must subject the suspect to a compelling environment that tends to undermine that privilege. In this
article, Professor Richard A. Williamson examines the application of
Miranda to Terry stops. He reviews the impact of the Beheler and
Berkemer decisions, which held that suspects who officials stop based
on reasonable suspicion, as opposed to suspects who officials arrest, are
not entitled to Miranda warnings. Professor Williamson generally
approves the Supreme Court's refusal to extend Miranda protections
to Terry stops. Yet he observes that the Fourth Amendment values
underlying the distinction between stops and arrests are not coextensive with the Fifth Amendment values underlying Miranda Emphasizing the expansion in recent years of the permissible scope of Terry
stops, he concludes that circumstances may arise in which officials
must give Miranda warnings to suspects stopped but not arrested.
I.

INTRODUCTION.

A familiar principle of the law of confessions holds that once a person has been "taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way," the police may not interrogate that person
without complying with the procedural safeguards mandated by Miranda v. Arizona. 1 Statements obtained during the period of custodial
interrogation without compliance with Miranda's mandate may not be
used, whether such statements are exculpatory or inculpatory, or
• Chancellor Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. Marshall- Wythe School of Law.
B.A. 1965, Ohio University; J.D. /968, Ohio State University.
L 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Examples of the immediate scholarly reaction to Miranda include Sheldon H. Elsen & Arthur Rosett, Protection for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67
CoLUM. L. REV. 645 (1967); Yale Karnisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments
on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1966);
Richard H. Kuh, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants--Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35
FoRDHAM L. REv. 233 (1966).
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whether they constitute "confessions" or merely "admissions" of part or
all of an offense. 2
In the years following Miranda, the Supreme Court decided numerous cases 3 that attempted to clarify and refine the message of Miranda,
including decisions that informed the meaning of the terms custody 4 and
interrogation. 5 The concepts of custody and interrogation are central to
the Miranda decision. If a person is not in custody when interrogated,
the procedural safeguards of Miranda do not apply. Likewise, a person
in custody but not interrogated receives no protection from the Miranda
decision. Only when the two concepts are joined-when custodial interrogation occurs-is the Miranda decision implicated. 6
Two Supreme Court decisions, California v. Beheler 7 and Berkemer
v. McCarty, 8 now nearly a decade old, forged a link between the Fourth
Amendment's concept of arrest and Miranda's concept of custody. In
Beheler the Supreme Court stated, in a per curiam opinion written without the benefit of briefs or argument on the merits, 9 that a suspect is not
in custody for Miranda purposes until "there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal
arrest." 10 Although that statement arguably was dictum, 11 one year
later 12 in Berkemer the Court applied the Beheler standard to a person
detained in a routine traffic stop. The Court held that the circumstances
of a routine traffic stop are analogous 13 to a "Terry stop" 14 and that the
2. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 476-77 ("No distinction can be drawn between statements which
are direct confessions and statements which amount to 'admissions' of part or all of an offense....
Similarly ... no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to
be merely 'exculpatory.' ").
3. See. e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) (holding that once Miranda's
right to counsel is invoked, the police "may not reinitiate interrogation· without counsel present,
whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney"); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675,
682-84 (1988) (holding that once Miranda's right to counsel is invoked, the police may not reinitiate
interrogation without counsel present, even about an offense unrelated to the subject of the initial
interrogation for which the right was invoked); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984)
(declaring that the "doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda" do not "require that it be applied in all its
rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the
public safety"); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1975) (holding that once the defendant has
invoked his right to remain silent, further interrogation is permissible so long as the defendant's right
to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 446 (1974)
(holding that Miranda warnings are "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution" but are,
instead, "prophylactic standards" designed to provide "practical reinforcement" for Fifth Amendment rights).
4. See, e.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
5. See. e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
7. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per curiam).
8. 468 u.s. 420 (1984).
9. See Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 (per curiam) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495
(1977)).
II. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
12. The Court repeated its dictum in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984), decided
prior to Berkemer. See infra note 85.
13. See infra note 101 (discussing the analogy).
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individual so detained is not, without more, in custody for Miranda purposes; ts therefore, he or she may be questioned without first receiving the
Miranda warnings. 16
Beheler and Berkemer specifically equated Miranda's concept of
custody with the Fourth Amendment concept of arrest. Prior to Beheler
and Berkemer, the relationship between the concepts was uncertain at
best.t' Following Beheler and Berkemer, a person under arrest or detained under circumstances functionally equivalent to an arrest, as the
term arrest is defined for Fourth Amendment purposes, is in custody for
Miranda purposes. Conversely, a person who has been detained, who
has suffered restrictions on freedom of movement, and who clearly has
been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, is not in custody for Miranda purposes unless formally arrested or subjected to restraints functionally equivalent to an arrest.
The Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination, the constitutional predicate for the Miranda decision, 18 is not, as
Berkemer and Beheler implicitly recognize, the only constitutional doctrine implicated when a suspect is taken into custody and questioned.
The government's action in imposing custodial restraints also constitutes
a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 19 Unless the
government supports the seizure with information sufficient to constitute
"reasonable suspicion" or "probable cause," depending on the nature of
the seizure, the Fourth Amendment is violated and the seizure is unlawful. 2° Confessions obtained during the period of unlawful detention may
be inadmissible even though the confession is otherwise voluntary and
obtained in full compliance with the Miranda decision?'
The procedural safeguards of Miranda therefore protect a suspect
who lawfully is in custody and interrogated. If the detention is unlawful,
the derivative evidence component of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule--not the Miranda decision-will require, at least in some
14. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968)).
15. /d. at 440.
16. See id. at 441-42.
17. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
18. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,439 (1966) ("[W]e deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself."); see infra notes 56-61
and accompanying text.
19. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 16 (1968) ("[W)henever a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person.").
20. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (plurality opinion); see also Wayne R.
LaFave, ''Seizures" Typology: Classifying Detentions of the Person to Resolve Warrant, Grounds, and
Search Issues, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 417, 418 (1984).
21. See, e.g., Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982) (stating that such confessions
"should be excluded unless intervening events break the causal connection between the illegal arrest
and the confession"); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216-17 (1979) (explaining that the
Fourth Amendment requirements are distinct from those of the Fifth Amendment).

382

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1993

cases, suppression of the confession. 22
The relationship between the concept of custody, as that term is
used in Miranda, and the concepts of seizure, stop, and arrest, as those
terms are defined for Fourth Amendment purposes, is more complex,
however, than the above discussion reveals. During approximately the
same period during which the Supreme Court promulgated and refined
the Miranda doctrine, it also validated under the Fourth Amendment a
police investigatory practice known as "stop and frisk." 23 Under the
stop and frisk doctrine, the police may undertake a temporary forcible
detention of a person and his or her possessions upon "reasonable suspicion" that criminal activity is afoot and may "frisk" the individual if they
believe him or her to be armed and dangerous. 24 Although the objects
and limits of the investigatory techniques permissible during the period
of the temporary forcible detention are not defined clearly, decisions interpreting the stop and frisk doctrine, some of which occurred after the
Court decided Beheler and Berkemer, 25 have held that the police may
pursue various methods of investigation, including questioning the person detained, for the purpose of either confirming or dispelling the suspicion that prompted the detention. 26 As Berkemer stated, none of the
stop and frisk decisions held that Miranda warnings must precede investigative questioning during the period of the temporary detention. 27
The analytical foundation for the stop and frisk doctrine is well
known and has produced what may be appropriately described as a twotier view of Fourth Amendment protections. 28 A person is seized within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when his or her freedom of
movement is restrained. 29 This test apparently requires examination of
the circumstances surrounding a police-citizen encounter to detem1ine
whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have be22. A confession obtained in compliance with Miranda but following an illegal arrest is inadmissible unless circumstances indicate a break in the causal connection between the unlawful arrest
and the confession. The factors that must be considered include whether Miranda warnings were
given, the "temporal proximity" between the arrest and the confession, the presence of "intervening
circumstances," and the "flagrancy of the official misconduct." See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 603-04 (1975).
23. The Supreme Court first used the terms stop and frisk in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 10
(1968). See generally Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron.
Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39 (1968).
24. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 30 (1968).
25. See infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
26. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,437-38 (1984); see infra note 117.
27. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-40.
28. Richard A. Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of "Stop" and ''Arrest",
43 OHIO ST. L.J. 771, 776 (1982). See generally Neil Ackerman, Comment, Considering the TwoTier Model of the Fourth Amendment, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 85 (1981).
29. Florida v. Bostick, lll S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 19 n.l6
(1968) (stating that a seizure occurs "[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen"). For a criticism of Bostick, see Bruce
A. Green, "Power, Not Reason':· Justice Marshall's Valedictory and the Fourth Amendment in the
Supreme Court's 1990 Term, 70 N.C. L. REV. 373, 396-400 (1992).
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lieved he or she was not free to leave. 30
Not every police-citizen encounter, however, constitutes a seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 31 If the person remains
free to disregard the contact with a police officer and walk away, no intrusion on personal liberty has occurred, the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated, and the Constitution requires no particularized and objective
justification. 32 A forcible detention that exceeds what reasonably can be
characterized as a "temporary" detention-that is, a detention that lasts
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the seizure33 or one
in which the investigative techniques employed during the detention are
not the "least intrusive" means reasonably available to verify or dispel
the officers' suspicions in a short period of time--constitutes an arrest
and must be supported by probable cause. 34 Reasonable suspicion, however, can support a temporary detention; thus, the quantum and quality
of information required to support such a detention is less than traditional probable cause. 35 All forcible detentions, however, are seizures
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 36
30. See infra note 142; see also Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (embracing
the reasonable person standard); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J.)
(requiring a show of official authority such that a "reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave"). See generally LaFave, supra note 20, at 420-26. The test whether a reasonable person would feel "free to leave," however, is applicable only when the factors that allegedly
produced the restraint originated in the actions of the government. See Bostick, Ill S. Ct. at 2387.
Otherwise, the issue is whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would "feel free to
decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." /d.
The reasonable person test for determining whether a seizure has occurred has been soundly
criticized. See Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in Determining When
Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437, 439 (1988) ("(l]t is generally accepted that, in fact, citizens almost never feel free to end an encounter initiated by a police
officer and walk away.").
31. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.l6. Street encounters between police officers and citizens are "incredibly rich in diversity." /d. at 13.
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an
individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some
questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence
in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion).
32. California v. Hodari D., IllS. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991). The Court's nonarrest detention
cases have been soundly criticized. See Green, supra note 29, at 400-04 ("A portion of the majority
opinion [in Hodari D.] discussing policy considerations suggests that the Hodari D. decision was in
fact dictated by a preference for promoting law enforcement"); Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the
Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CoRNELL L. REV. 1258, 1297 (1990)
(stating that the Court has adopted "unrealistic and deceptive standards for deciding when a person
has been seized for fourth amendment purposes").
Merely asking someone a question does not constitute a seizure. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,
216 (1984). Likewise, merely chasing after a suspect to see where he is going does not constitute a
seizure. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574-75 (1988).
33. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985); see infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
34. Royer, 460 U.S. at 504-06; see infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
35. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417-18 (1981) (explaining that reasonable suspicion requires a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity").
36. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 16 (1968).
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The intersection and potential conflict between the Miranda decision and the stop and frisk doctrine are clear. 37 A person is in custody
for Miranda purposes whenever that person has been deprived of his or
her freedom of movement in any "significant way." 38 A person is seized
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment whenever the government, by means of physical force or show of authority, restrains the person's freedom of movement. 39 Prior to Beheler and Berkemer, the nearly
unanimous view of the lower federal and state courts was that a person
"under arrest" was "in custody" for Miranda purposes; 40 thus, he or she
could not be interrogated unless the procedural safeguards of Miranda
were met. However, the pre-Beheler/Berkemer decisions understandably made no attempt to utilize emerging Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to resolve the Miranda custody question, apart from vague,
conclusory references to suspects "under arrest. " 41
Certainly, courts could have concluded easily that an individual's
freedom of movement is restricted in a "significant way" (that is, the
person is in custody for Miranda purposes) when, but only when, the
person is "under arrest" as that term is normally understood. An individual whose freedom of movement is restricted, but only to the extent
that the person has been "stopped" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, arguably has not suffered the type of "significant" restraints on freedom of movement required by Miranda. This mode of
analysis assumes that the concepts of custody and seizure are not synonymous; instead, a person is in custody only when the person is "under
arrest."
The problems with this proffered analysis are threefold. First, the
analysis assumes that all "stops" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment are insignificant intrusions on personal liberty, hardly a selfevident proposition, particularly because the Supreme Court never specifically has identified the factors by which to measure the intrusiveness
of a seizure. Second, it assumes that the Fourth Amendment values that
define the differences between "stops" and "arrests" also inform the Fifth
Amendment based analytical distinction recognized in Miranda between
custodial and noncustodial interrogation. Finally, the analysis assumes
that all suspects "under arrest" suffer the type of compelling environment that triggers the need for Miranda warnings prior to interrogation.
37. "(T]he core meaning both of 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment sense, and of 'custody' in
the Miranda sense, appears to be the same: the restraint of a person's 'freedom to walk away' from
the police." United States v. Brunson, 549 F.2d 348, 357 n.12 (5th Cir.), cen. denied, 434 U.S. 842
(1977).
38. 384 u.s. 436, 444 (1966).
39. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
40. See, e.g, United States v. Jimenez, 602 F.2d 139, 141-43 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding Miranda
inapplicable because the defendant was not under arrest at the time of the statement); United States
v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1969) (stating that "in the absence of actual arrest something
must be said or done by the authorities ... which indicates that they would not have heeded a
request to depart"), cert denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970).
4 I. See cases cited supra note 40.

No.2]

SHARED VALUES

385

The use of Fourth Amendment values and theories to define Miranda's
concept of custody therefore presents substantial analytical problems.
Precisely because the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that defines
and differentiates the concepts of stop and arrest is derived from values
seemingly unrelated to the values underlying the Miranda decision, presumptive equation of the concepts of "arrest" and "custody" is questionable. A person who is "under arrest" for Fourth Amendment purposes
might not suffer the type of compelling environment that serves as the
essential predicate for the Miranda rules. 42 Likewise, some individuals
subject to investigative detentions who merely have been stopped within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment may in fact need the protections
provided by the Miranda safeguards because of the compelling circumstances of the detention. 43 Following Beheler and Berkemer, the Court
decided several cases44 that significantly expanded the nature and scope
of permissible activity during a Terry stop, thereby indirectly affecting
the protections afforded by the Miranda decision to suspects temporarily
detained. Therefore, unless the Fourth Amendment values that define
the concept of arrest and distinguish it from the lesser form of detention
known as a stop remain sufficiently sensitive to the factors that inform
Miranda's concept of custody, Beheler and Berkemer significantly distort
the Fifth Amendment values advanced by the Miranda decision.
Arguably, an analysis of the Beheler and Berkemer decisions that
focuses solely on the Miranda aspects of the cases is incomplete. The
conclusion that the two cases significantly and unjustifiably weaken the
analytical foundation of Miranda ignores the consequences of the decisions on the investigatory practice known as stop and frisk. One persuasive justification for Beheler and Berkemer might be simply that the
objects of the stop and frisk doctrine would be frustrated if the police
were required to administer Miranda warnings prior to questioning of
suspects temporarily detained for further investigation. 45 Moreover, full
implementation of Miranda in nonarrest detentions would be impracticable because of the difficulty in quickly supplying counsel should the suspect invoke his right to counsel. 46 Thus, perhaps the most compelling
rationale for Beheler and Berkemer is that Miranda's requirements must
be limited to cases involving a formal arrest or its functional equivalent
because to extend the concept of custody to all detentions (i.e., seizures)
for questioning would be impracticable and would significantly and unjustifiably undermine the purposes of the legitimate investigative technique known as stop and frisk.
This article analyzes the various doctrines and theories described
42. See infra notes
43. See infra notes
44. See infra notes
45. George E. Dix,
L.J. 849, 947.
46. /d. at 945- 46.

70-72 and accompanying text.
71-72 and accompanying text ..
121-30 and accompanying text.
Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law, 1985 DUKE
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above; its primary focus is on the impact of Beheler and Berkemer and
their use of Fourth Amendment values and theories to define Miranda's
concept of custody. The article examines the effect of Beheler and
Berkemer on (and hence, the application of Miranda to) the rubric of
investigative detentions that constitute stops within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Part II briefly traces the history and analytical justification for the application of the Miranda safeguards for only those
persons in custody when interrogated. 47 Part III analyzes the developing
Fourth Amendment distinction between the concepts of stop and arrest,
with particular focus on the constitutional values that inform the distinction between the two concepts. 48 Finally, Part IV concludes that
although the relationship between the articulated values that inform the
distinction between the concepts of stop and arrest and the articulated
values that inform Miranda's concept of custody are not perfect, substantial fulfillment of the objectives of the Miranda decision has been
achieved and the function of the stop and frisk doctrine has not been
frustrated by the presumptive equation of Miranda's concept of custody
with the Fourth Amendment concept of arrest. 49
The presumption that a person detained in a Terry stop is not in
custody is defensible, however, only if two conditions are met. First,
courts must interpret and apply existing precedent defining the term
arrest in a manner that gives full recognition to the Fourth Amendment
values that are implicated when a seizure occurs. Specifically, courts
must recognize that the Fourth Amendment's command that seizures of
people be reasonable cannot be implemented fully simply by use of a
clock and a yardstick. Qualitative as well as quantitative interests define
the nature of our right to be free of unreasonable seizures. The reasonableness of a seizure "depends on not only when [it] is made but also how
it is carried out. " 50 Thus, in categorizing a seizure, courts must consider
the amount of force applied or threatened. Moreover, although liberty or
freedom of movement is a valued right because a right to go when and
where we choose is essential to a truly free society, liberty or freedom of
movement is a valued right also because it is one means by which we can
lawfully avoid the government's evidence gathering techniques. 51 Thus,
in categorizing a seizure, courts also must consider both the number and
intrusive character of the evidence gathering techniques employed by the
police during the detention.
Second, courts must recognize and implement a subtle, yet significant, distinction between Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence
grounded in the values each constitutional provision advances.
Berkemer holds that the subject of an investigative detention is in cus47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See infra notes 54-107 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 108-40 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 141-50 and accompanying text.
Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. I, 8 (1985).
See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
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tody for Miranda purposes whenever, during the period of the detention,
a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was "under
arrest," even though that fact was not communicated to the suspect prior
to questioning. 52 By contrast, under prevailing Fourth Amendment standards, for purposes of characterizing the detention as a stop or an arrest,
a suspect's belief or the belief of a reasonable person in the suspect's position that he or she was "under arrest" is not controlling. 53 Instead, the
controlling issue is whether the circumstances of the detention were
within the permissible range of activities authorized in a Terry stop. This
subtle yet significant difference in analysis provides the basis for concluding, under appropriate circumstances, that a suspect who has merely
been "stopped" for Fourth Amendment purposes nonetheless is "incustody" for Miranda purposes.
II.
A.

THE CONCEPT OF CUSTODY

The Essential Predicate of the Miranda Decision

The historical antecedents and fundamental assumptions leading to
the promulgation of the Miranda decision are well .documented elsewhere and will not be repeated herein. 54 It is instructive, however, to
examine one aspect of the Miranda decision-the limitation that the required warnings need be given only "after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."5s
In Miranda, the Supreme Court sought to provide some method to
ensure that individuals subject to police interrogation were accorded
their Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to incriminate themselves. 56 The Court specifically held that the Fifth Amendment privilege
was available outside criminal court proceedings and protected people
"in all settings in which their freedom of action [was] curtailed." 57 The
element of compulsion, however, was the key to the Miranda decision.
The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the police or other institutions
52. 468 u.s. 420, 442 (1984).
53. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
54. See Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1417, 1443-50 (1985);
Fred E. Inbau, Over-reaction-The Mischief of Miranda v. Arizona, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
797, 806-08 (1982); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to
Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1826, 1837-38 (1987); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering
Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 435-53 (1987).
55. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
56. /d. at 439.
57. /d. at 467. Justice Harlan disagreed:
Historically, the privilege against self-incrimination did not bear at all on the use of extra-legal
confessions, for which distinct standards evolved . . . . Even those who would readily enlarge
the privilege must concede some linguistic difficulties since the Fifth Amendment in terms proscribes only compelling any person "in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
See id. at 510-11 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and
Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1, 25-26 (A. E. Dick
Howard ed., 1965)).
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of government from asking questions, 58 nor does it prohibit a suspect
from volunteering an incriminating statement. 59 What the Fifth Amendment does prohibit is the use of any practice or tactic that compels a
person to incriminate himself or herself. The prohibited element of compulsion is present, according to the Miranda decision, in all cases of "incustody" interrogation. 60 The inherent compulsion exerted by police
during in-custody interrogation arises from the fact that the individual is
"swept from familiar surroundings," is "surrounded by antagonistic
forces," and is subjected to interrogation techniques, largely psychological, designed to "subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner." 61
Having found compulsion inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation, Miranda held that in order to combat these pressures and to
permit the full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the suspect "must be adequately and effectively apprised of his
rights" prior to questioning. 62 Moreover, the Miranda decision mandated that a suspect's exercise of those rights be honored fully. 63
Miranda therefore proceeds from the assumption that a significant
deprivation of freedom of movement-the government's exercise of the
right to impose forcible restraints on an individual's freedom of action,
together with police-initiated questioning-necessarily generates a form
of prohibited compulsion. Cases decided both before64 and after65 Mi58. "The Constitution does not forbid the asking of criminative questions." United States v.
Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 433 (1943); see Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1984). The
privilege against self-incrimination applies only when responses are compelled, see Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976), and when the responses might tend to incriminate. Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951).
59. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429.
60. "[W]ithout proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected
or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
61. /d. at 457, 461. The Court described Miranda and its companion cases as "shar[ing] salient features-incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere." /d.
at 445. In Miranda and each of its three companion cases "the defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures." /d. at 457. The
interrogation environment faced by each defendant was "created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner." ld.
62. /d. at 467. "At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he
must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent." /d. at
467-68. "The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that
anything said can and will be used against the individual in court." /d. at 469. "[A]n individual
held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to
have the lawyer with him during interrogation." /d. at 471. "In order to fully apprise a person
interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system ... it is necessary to warn him ... that if he
is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him." /d. at 4 73.
63. "If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that
he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." /d. at 473-74. "If the individual states
that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." /d. at 474.
64. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936) (prohibiting compulsion by
torture).
65. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401-02 (1978) (finding that a seriously wounded
suspect's will was overborne during hospital interrogation). See generally Steven J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 878-84 (1981) (reviewing YALE KAMISAR, POLICE
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randa have held that other prohibited forms of compulsion, physical or
psychological, may occur in addition to those flowing from the fact of incustody questioning. The fact remains, however, that following Miranda, a person in custody necessarily and always, regardless of circumstances, is considered subject to prohibited compulsion when
interrogated, unless first effectively warned of his or her constitutional
rights.
Unfortunately, Miranda did not define further the meaning of custody. 66 Because the decision did not use the familiar term arrest to describe what the Court meant by custody, one could argue that the Court
intended to leave open the possibility that a person not under arrest
nonetheless could be in custody. In fact, Miranda was decided nearly
two years before the Supreme Court first explicitly recognized the species
of Fourth Amendment search and seizure activity known as stop and
frisk. 67
On the other hand, the Miranda decision, at one point, did equate
the concept of custody with an "investigation which had focused on the
accused" 68 and referred several times to questioning that occurred in a
"police-dominated atmosphere." 69 Based upon the language used in the
Miranda opinion, it is possible to posit that although the concept of custody should not be restricted to interrogation at the station house of a
suspect formally arrested and charged, neither should it be construed to
include questioning following all forcible detentions outside the station
house regardless of the circumstances. Certainly, not all forcible detentions outside the station house produce ipse dixit a "police dominated
atmosphere," 70 nor is the individual who has been detained in a Terry
stop necessarily and in all cases "swept from familiar surroundings" and
"surrounded by antagonistic forces. " 71
Although one can argue that the logic of Miranda does not require
warnings for every suspect detained (i.e., seized), the same argument can
be made about station house interrogation of suspects formally arrested-not all suspects formally arrested and subjected to interrogation
necessarily subjectively realize the type of compulsion identified by the
Miranda decision. The problem with Miranda, as with any other deciINTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: EssAYS IN LAW AND POLICY (1980) (discussing the effect of
Miranda on the "voluntariness" test)).
66. Chief Justice Warren stated simply that the custody component of "custodial interrogation" meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officials after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at
444.
67. See supra note 23.
68. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 n.4 ("This is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an
investigation which had focused on an accused.").
69. See id. at 445, 456.
70. "But even if the relentless application of the . . . procedures [described by the majority]
could lead to involuntary confessions, it most assuredly does not follow that each and every case will
disclose this kind of interrogation or this kind of consequence." /d. at 533 (White, J., dissenting).
71. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.

390

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1993

sion designed to provide easily administered guidelines, is one of line
drawing: How far beyond the situation of station house interrogation of a
suspect formally arrested can the factual predicate of Miranda-the element of presumed coercion that flows from a deprivation of freedom of
movement-be sustained?
Prior to Beheler and Berkemer, the Supreme Court decided several
cases in which the concept of custody was at issue72 but no cases that
confronted directly the issue of the applicability of Miranda to situations
involving the questioning of suspects during the period of a temporary
72. The Supreme Court's most significant post-Miranda treatment of the concept of custody
was in Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969). In a short, otherwise unilluminating opinion written
by Justice Black, the Supreme Court held that questioning of a suspect under arrest in the confines of
his boardinghouse room was the type of circumstance that was within the scope of the Miranda
decision. /d. at 326-27. Orozco was important for several reasons. First, the decision established
that a suspect could be deemed "in custody" even though questioned outside of a police station and
in familiar surroundings. /d. at 326. Second, a suspect could be deemed "in custody" despite the
fact that, prior to the questioning that produced the incriminating responses, the suspect apparently
was never informed that he was under arrest. See id. at 325. Although one of the officers later
admitted that Orozco "was not free to go" and was "under arrest," the officers apparently did not
tell Orozco that at the time of the questioning. /d. Finally, Orozco is important because, implicit in
the decision was the conclusion that a suspect "under arrest" is, without more and regardless of the
actual state of affairs as they might bear on the element of compulsion, in custody for Miranda
purposes. See id. at 327 (emphasizing that the defendant was "under arrest and not free to leave").
Although Orozco did not purport to limit the concept of custody to the more familiar and welldefined class of suspects who were arrested (formal as well as de facto), the decision did imply that
the concept of custody included at least all cases where an arrest, however defined, had occurred.
If Orozco represented the inclusive definition of custody, the exclusive definition came in Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). Beckwith involved questioning by special agents of the
Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service in a private home where the defendant occasionally stayed. /d. at 342. The agents informed Beckwith that they were assigned to investigate his
federal tax liability and that one of their functions was to investigate the possibility of criminal tax
fraud. /d. at 343. Prior to questioning, the agents read Beckwith a modified version of the Miranda
warnings. Beckwith acknowledged that he understood his rights and answered questions over a
period of nearly three hours. Id. at 342-43. At the conclusion of the interview, Beckwith and the
agents went separately to Beckwith's place of employment where he kept certain records. I d. at 34344. Both the district court and the court of appeals concluded that Beckwith was not "in custody"
during the interview, and the Supreme Court agreed. /d. at 344.
Given the absence of words or conduct indicating that Beckwith's freedom of movement had
been restricted, he argued that the essential predicate of Miranda-the element of compulsionshould be extended to noncustodial circumstances after a police investigation had "focused on the
suspect." /d. at 345. The Court rejected the argument, holding that such an extension would "cut
[the Miranda decision] completely loose from its own explicitly stated rationale[:] that compulsion
... 'inherent in custodial surroundings.'" /d. at 345-46 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458). The
fact that Beckwith was a suspect, that he was the "focus" of the investigation, was, standing alone,
insufficient to invoke the protections of Miranda. /d. at 347. Finally, the Court held that Beckwith's circumstances at the time of questioning could not be described as "incommunicado interrogation ... in a police-dominated atmosphere," id. at 346, nor did the officers employ the familiar
psychological ploy described in Miranda leading to successful interrogation-that of isolating the
suspect in unfamiliar surroundings " 'for no purpose other than to subjugate him to the will of his
examiner.'" /d. at 346 n.7 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457).
Beckwith was significant for two reasons. First, the decision made clear that not every policecitizen encounter involving questions asked by the police constitutes a form of custodial interrogation, even though the police clearly suspect the person of criminal activity and even though the
questions asked obviously are designed to elicit incriminating responses. Second, Beckwith established that the concept of custody is not entirely metaphysical. Instead, it embodies the requirement
of some form of government-initiated restraint on freedom of movement. Although Beckwith did
not hold that such restraints can only exist if manifested by unambiguous physical conduct or words
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detention constituting a stop within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Case law treatment of the concept in lower courts was in a state of
disarray. 73
B.

Beheler and Berkemer

Beheler was convicted of aiding and abetting the murder of a drug
dealer. 74 Following the killing, he called the police and informed them
that his companion had killed the victim. Police found the murder
weapon in Beheler's backyard where it had been hidden, and the search
leading to discovery of the gun was undertaken with Beheler's consent.
Despite his admitted involvement in the murder, Beheler apparently was
not arrested immediately; instead, later the same day, he "voluntarily
agreed" to accompany the police to the station house, having been told
that he "was not under arrest. " 75 At the station house, without the benefit of Miranda warnings, Beheler agreed to talk about the murder. Following an interview that lasted less than thirty minutes, the police
allowed Beheler to leave. 76 Five days later he was arrested and after receiving Miranda warnings again confessed. 77 The intermediate appellate
court in California held that the first interview constituted custodial interrogation and thus the statements obtained were inadmissible because
that leave no doubt that the person is not free to leave, some proof of police-imposed restraints is
required.
One year after Beckwith, the Supreme Court decided Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977)
(per curiam), a case that confirmed much of what had been implicit in Beckwith and Orozco. In
Mathiason, the defendant voluntarily submitted to questioning at the offices of the state police. /d.
at 493. When he arrived at the state police offices, he was taken to a room where he was informed he
was "not under arrest." /d. The office door was closed and the defendant was given a seat at a desk
across from the investigating officer. /d. The investigating officer told the defendant the police
wanted to question him about a burglary and that his truthfulness "would be considered by the
district attorney or judge." !d. The officer next falsely told the defendant that his fingerprints had
been found at the scene of the crime. /d. The defendant then confessed. /d.
The Supreme Court held that the confession was admissible and that the police are not required
to administer Miranda warnings to everyone they question. !d. at 495. Instead, "Miranda warnings
are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom [of movement] as to
render him 'in custody.' " I d. Additionally, the Court held that the fact that the questioning occurred at the station house or the fact that the person questioned was an actual suspect did not alter
the result. I d.
73. Many lower court decisions seemingly equated Miranda's concept of custody with the concept of seizure-whether the suspect was free to go. See, e.g., United States v. McCain, 556 F.2d
253, 255 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 990 (1970); People v. Camacho, 427 N.Y.S.2d 203, 206 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). Other decisions
looked to factors such as whether, at the time of questioning, the police actually possessed probable
cause to arrest, although no formal arrest had been made, see Harris v. State, 376 So. 2d 773, 774
(Ala. Crim. App.), writ denied, 376 So. 2d 778 (Ala. 1979); State v. Creach, 461 P.2d 329, 331-32
(Wash. 1969) (en bane), or whether the police indicated that the person detained was a prime suspect. See State v. Menne, 380 So. 2d 14, 17 (La.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980). Finally, some
courts examined the circumstances of the detention for indications of coercion. See United States v.
Jones, 630 F.2d 613, 616 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Jimenez, 602 F.2d 139, 144 (7th Cir.
1979).
74. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1122 (1983) (per curiam).
15. ld.
76. ld.
77. ld.
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the police failed to administer Miranda warnings. The intermediate appellate court based its holding on the facts that the questioning took
place at the station house, that Beheler at the time was a suspect, and
that the interview was designed to produce incriminating responses. 78
In a per curiam opinion written without the benefit of briefs or argument on the merits, 79 the Supreme Court reversed. The Court understandably found the case "remarkably similar" to the facts presented in
Oregon v. Mathiason. 80 The Court held, quoting Mathiason, that "Miranda warnings are not required 'simply because the questioning takes
place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom
the police suspect.' " 81 In a single sentence of arguable dictum, however,
the Court suggested that Miranda's concept of custody was more definitive than previously thought. Quoting further from Mathiason, the
Court stated that the ultimate inquiry is whether there is " 'a formal
arrest or restraint on freedom of movement.' " 82 The "ultimate inquiry"
described in Mathiason, however, was modified in Beheler by the addition of the key phrase, "of the degree associated with a formal arrest." 83
Because Beheler's detention raised no apparent distinction between
stops and arrests, 84 it is indeed curious that the Court used the Beheler
opinion as the vehicle for announcement of a more definitive definition of
Miranda's concept of custody. Although it is both reasonable and prudent to assume that the Supreme Court chooses its words carefully and
deliberately, given the arguably dictum quality of Beheler's specific language defining the concept of custody, how the new standard actually
would determine the outcome was unclear until a case arose in which the
questioning occurred in the context of a Terry stop. That case arose during the next Term in Berkemer v. McCarty. 85
McCarty was stopped by the Ohio State Highway Patrol after an
officer observed McCarty's vehicle weaving in and out of traffic. After
78. Id. at 1122-23.
79. See id. at 1127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam); see supra note 72 (discussing Mathiason).
81. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per
curiam)).
82. Id. (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495).
83. I d. Prior to Beheler, because of Orozco, a suspect "under arrest" was deemed "in custody"
for Miranda purposes, apparently without regard to the other circumstances of the detention. See
supra note 72. But custody was also found in the absence of a formal arrest-when significant
restraints on freedom of movement had been imposed. See supra note 73.
84. As was the case in Mathiason, see supra note 72, Beheler had voluntarily accompanied the
police to the station for questioning, see Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1122; therefore, he had not been seized
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and no issue regarding the nature of his detention
was presented.
85. 468 U.S. 420 (1984). Prior to the Berkemer decision, the Court cited Beheler's dictum in
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984). In Murphy, the Court held that a probationer was not
in custody for Miranda purposes during an interview with his probation officer even though he was
required to attend the interview and answer all questions truthfully. Id. at 422, 425. The Court,
citing Beheler, found that "there was no 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the
degree associated with a formal arrest." Id. at 430 (quoting Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125).
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the officer asked McCarty to get out of his vehicle, he noticed that McCarty had difficulty standing. 86 At that point, the officer decided that
McCarty would be charged with an offense and thus was not free to leave
the scene, but the officer did not immediately communicate this decision
to McCarty. 87 The officer asked McCarty to take a "field sobriety test."
McCarty could not perform the test without falling. 88 The officer then
asked McCarty whether he had been using intoxicants. McCarty responded that he "had consumed two beers and had smoked several joints
of marijuana a short time before. " 89 The officer then "formally" arrested
McCarty and transported him to the county jail. 90 The Ohio courts refused to suppress the statements despite the lack of Miranda warnings,
holding that Miranda was not applicable to misdemeanor arrests. 91
The Supreme Court held that McCarty's statements made prior to
his formal arrest were admissible. 92 The Court described the issue
presented as "whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained
pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered 'custodial interrogation.' " 93 In an apparent attempt to reconcile Miranda's phraseology
as the beginning point for its analysis, the Court acknowledged that a
traffic stop "significantly curtails the 'freedom of action' " of the occupants detained and that "few motorists would feel free either to disobey a
directive to pull over or to leave the scene ... without being told they
might do so." 94 Thus, the Court concluded that a traffic stop is a seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 95
The Court's strict adherence to Miranda's phraseology, however,
was short-lived. The Court refused to accord "talismanic power" to Miranda's assertion that custody included cases where the suspect was "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" and furthermore
held that "[f]idelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that
it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the
concerns that powered the decision are implicated.'' 96 Thus, the perti86. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 423.
87. /d.
88. /d.
89. /d.
90. /d. At the jail, McCarty was given an "intoxilyzer test" to determine blood alcohol content. /d. The test was negative. /d. The officer further questioned McCarty, and McCarty again
admitted that he had been drinking. /d. at 423-24. McCarty denied that he had smoked marijuana
treated with chemicals. /d. at 424.
91. See id. at 424-25.
In federal habeas corpus proceedings, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Ohio courts on the applicability of Miranda to misdemeanor arrests, but upheld the admission of at least some of McCarty's
statements made prior to his "formal arrest." /d. at 425-26. The remainder of the Sixth Circuit's
opinion is unclear. The Supreme Court interpreted the holding as "uncertain as to the status of the
prearrest confessions." /d. at 426.
92. /d. at 442.
93. /d. at 435.
94. /d. at 436.
95. /d. at 436-37.
96. Id. at 435-37.
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nent inquiry was "whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person
pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against
self-incrimination. " 97
For two reasons, the Court concluded that it did not. First, a routine traffic detention is "presumptively temporary and brief." 98 Second,
because the detention is public and, in the normal case, the detained motorist is confronted by one or at most two policemen, 99 the ordinary traffic stop is "substantially less 'police dominated' than . . . the kinds of
interrogation at issue in Miranda." 100
The Court then articulated the link between Fourth Amendment
principles and Miranda's concept of custody, asserting that the "usual
traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop' than to a formal
arrest," 101 and that the "comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda." 102 Thus,
for the first time, the Court held explicitly that the variety of Fourth
Amendment seizures known as stops do not require Miranda warnings.
The Court went on to acknowledge that the line between Terry stops
and arrests is uncertain and would continue to cause interpretive
97. Id. at 437.
98. I d. Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall asserted that "[t]he vast majority of roadside
detentions last only a few minutes." According to Justice Marshall:
A motorist's expectations, when he sees a policeman's light flashing behind him, are that he will
be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer
checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he
most likely will be allowed to continue on his way.
I d.
99. Id. at 438. Justice Marshall acknowledged that "the aura of authority surrounding an
armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether
to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions." I d.
100. Id. at 439.
101. Id. (citation omitted). Berkemer causes interpretative problems precisely because the
Court analogized the circumstances of a traffic stop to a "Terry stop." In reality, most "traffic
stops" are not "Terry stops" in the true sense of the concept. A motorist detained in a traffic stop
normally is detained based on probable cause, not reasonable suspicion, that a traffic infraction has
occurred. The issue in many traffic stop cases is whether the officer will issue a notice of violation
and summons or effectuate a full custodial arrest, thereby giving the officer the right to search the
suspect and his or her automobile. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460 (1981); United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
Nonetheless, the fact remains that McCarty apparently was not stopped and detained pursuant
to the authority of Terry; he was, instead, apparently stopped and detained based upon probable
cause to believe he was driving while intoxicated. Justice Marshall did, however, state that nothing
"more is implied by this analogy than that most traffic stops resemble, in duration and atmosphere,
the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439 n.29. Justice Marshall
also specifically stated that nothing in Berkemer should be read to limit the authority of the police to
engage in activity beyond that authorized by Terry so long as the detention is supported by probable
cause. Id. Presumably, Justice Marshall was referring to the right of the police to make a full
custodial arrest and to search incident to arrest. Berkemer, thus, is not a case about Fourth Amendment limits on Terry stops; it is a case about the application of Miranda and the Fifth Amendment
to the circumstances of a Terry stop. Berkemer did not hold that a traffic stop is a Terry stop;
instead, Berkemer held that a routine traffic stop is like a Terry stop.
102. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440.
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problems, even in the context of traffic stops. 103 The Court, however,
declined to specify precisely how a court should decide whether freedom
of movement was curtailed to the degree of a de facto arrest. At one
point in the opinion the Court did say, without further elaboration, that
"the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." 104 McCarty's initial detention, however, was not comparable to a formal arrest. He was detained
only a short period before the formal arrest; he was not told that his
detention would be other than temporary; he was confronted by a single
police officer; and although he was asked to get out of his vehicle, he was
asked only a moderate number of questions and asked to perform a simple balancing test, all in view of passing motorists. 105
The Behe/er/Berkemer linkage of the Fourth Amendment concept
of arrest with Miranda's concept of custody has obvious appeal. Apart
from the adverse impact required Miranda warnings would have on the
routine Terry stop, 106 use of the frequently litigated Fourth Amendment
standard delineating the difference between a stop and an arrest adds an
element of certainty and clarity to Miranda's concept of custody that,
theretofore, had been missing. 107 Predictability is a virtue, however, only
if the test employed bears some relationship to the values advanced by
Miranda. The issue unaddressed in Berkemer was how and why the
Fourth Amendment values that distinguish a stop from an arrest are sufficiently sensitive to the Miranda distinction between custodial and noncustodial interrogation so that the marriage between the two doctrines is
not just one of convenience but one based on shared values.
103. Admittedly, our adherence to the doctrine [that Miranda is applicable as soon as a sus·
pect's freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest) ... will mean that
the police and lower courts will continue occasionally to have difficulty deciding exactly when a
suspect has been taken into custody. Either a rule that Miranda applies to all traffic stops or a
rule that a suspect need not be advised of his rights until he is formally placed under arrest
would provide a clearer, more easily administered line.
Id. at 441.
104. /d. at 442. At least one lower court has assumed that the reasonable person through whom
they view the circumstances is someone neutral to the environment and to the purposes of the investigation. The reasonable person is someone "neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly
apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances." United States v. Bengivenga,
845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988).
The Court in Berkemer also addressed the relevance of the state of mind of the police in effectuating the seizure. McCarty argued that the issue in the case was whether Miranda warnings are
required in a traffic stop when the officer has probable cause to arrest but does not communicate that
intent to the suspect prior to questioning. The Court declined to limit its holding to that situation,
finding that Miranda "has little to do with the strength of an interrogating officer's suspicions" and
that such a rule "would be extremely difficult to administer." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 435 n.22. The
Court also rejected the argument that to "exempt" the routine traffic stop from Miranda, including
cases in which there is both probable cause to arrest and an unarticulated intent to do so, would
encourage police to circumvent Miranda by delaying formal arrest until after questioning. The
Court could provide no support for rejecting the proffered scenario other than to say that they were
"confident that the state of affairs projected ... will not come to pass." /d. at 440.
105. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441-42.
106. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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III. THE CONCEPTS OF STOP AND ARREST
During the past decade, the Supreme Court diligently attempted to
clarify the Fourth Amendment distinction between a nonarrest detention
(a Terry stop) and an arrest. Although implementation of the guidelines
remains difficult, the Court has provided at least some fixed reference
points. 108 More importantly, the Court has greatly expanded the circumstances under which the stop and frisk doctrine can be invoked, 109
thereby necessarily increasing the likelihood of Miranda issues arising
during police interrogation of suspects temporarily detained. For example, the Court has held that a nonarrest detention can be made for purposes of investigating a completed crime as well as for crime prevention
purposes. 110 Although the Court has not authorized Terry stops to investigate all past crimes, however serious, it has stated that "if police
have a reasonable suspicion ... that a person ... was involved in or is
wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be
made to investigate that suspicion." 111 Thus, the Terry stop and frisk
doctrine clearly now is applicable to circumstances other than the Terry
paradigm of a "street encounter" confrontation with a potentially armed
and dangerous suspect who is about to commit a crime.
The doctrine also has undergone transformations in other respects.
Although the principal limitation on a nonarrest detention remains temporal in nature (at some point, the length of a detention, standing alone,
will transform a nonarrest detention into a de facto arrest), the Court has
held that the "intrusiveness" of the investigative means employed during
the period of the nonarrest detention is a factor that must be
considered. 112
Florida v. Royer, 113 decided one year before Berkemer, remains one
of the Supreme Court's most significant rulings on the limits of nonarrest
108. See infra notes 113-30 and accompanying text.
109. The Court has, applying the principles of Terry, approved a temporary detention of personal effects based on reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983).
The Court also has authorized a protective search for weapons in the interior of an automobile
during a Terry stop. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1046 (1983).
110. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985); see infra note 129 and accompanying
text.
III. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229.
ll2. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
113. 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion). State narcotic officers working the Miami airport
noticed Royer because he fit their "drug courier profile." The officers approached the boarding area,
identified themselves as police officers, and asked if Royer had a " 'moment' to speak with them."
Royer said, "Yes." I d. at 494. Royer produced his airline ticket and his driver's license upon request. The ticket and his baggage identification tags carried the name "Holt," whereas his driver's
license correctly identified him as "Royer." In response to the officers' inquiry concerning the discrepancy, Royer said that a friend had made the reservation under the name "Holt." According to
the officers, Royer became "more nervous." Jd. At this point, the officers informed Royer that they
were narcotics officers and suspected him of transporting narcotics. Without returning Royer's
ticket and driver's license, they asked him to accompany them to a room, located approximately 40
feet away. The room was described as a "large storage closet" containing a small desk and two
chairs. Id. Royer did not respond but followed the officers. Without Royer's consent, using his
baggage check stubs, the officers retrieved Royer's luggage and had it brought to the room. Royer
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detentions. In Royer, the Supreme Court held that the "scope of the
intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and
circumstances of each case." 114 The detention, however, "must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop." 115 Additionally, Royer held that "the investigative methods
employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." 116
The Royer decision was important because the Court recognized
that various investigative techniques--other than frisking or questioning
the suspect-could be employed during the period of a Terry stop.
Although questioning of the suspect undoubtedly remains the primary
investigative tool that is permissible during a Terry stop, other practices
also are legitimate; for example, detention for the purpose of bringing
eyewitnesses or other detection devices to the scene. 117
Most importantly, however, Royer implicitly established that the
Fourth Amendment values implicated in nonarrest detentions include interests beyond mere deprivation of the suspect's freedom of movement.
Even though a detention will become indistinguishable from an arrest at
some point due to the mere passage of time, 118 it also may become indistinguishable from an arrest simply because of the intrusive nature of the
investigative means employed. Royer's detention became indistinguishwas asked to consent to a search of the baggage. Without responding, Royer produced a key and
opened one bag in which the police found marijuana. /d.
114. /d. at 500.
115. /d.
116. /d. The Court suppressed the evidence obtained as a result of the allegedly consensual
search of Royer's suitcase, holding that Royer was illegally detained at the time he gave the consent.
The Court's determination that Royer was illegally detained was based on its findings that, "[a]s a
practical matter, Royer was under arrest" at the time he gave consent, id. at 503, and, at that time,
the officers lacked probable cause for Royer's arrest. /d. at 507.
The least intrusive means test has been applied in the context of other Fourth Amendment
issues and, arguably, is simply a part of a more general balancing test. See Nadine Strossen, The
Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 1238-42 (1988). Strossen argues that courts do not possess
the expertise needed to evaluate the relative intrusiveness of police evidence gathering activities. /d.
at 1245.
Although problems measuring and comparing the relative intrusiveness of specific conduct certainly do exist and Royer is appropriately criticized for introducing the test in the context of detention categorizing, "intrusiveness" can be measured in the first instance only if we know with
precision the interests and values advanced by the Fourth Amendment. A particular police practice
is intrusive only if it adversely affects interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Royer is significant precisely because the Court held that, in the context of categorizing detentions, Fourth Amendment values include concern for the privacy interests of persons detained.
117. The Court concluded that the officers' interest in Royer centered on his luggage. Royer,
460 U.S. at 505. The officers' desire to determine whether Royer was carrying narcotics could have
been confirmed or dispelled, said the Court, without the necessity of detaining Royer and isolating
him in a small room hoping to get his consent to a search of the luggage by simply using a dog to
detect the presence of drugs. /d. at 505-06.
Apart from questioning and holding suspects while eyewitnesses are brought to the scene,
courts have upheld Terry stops for the purposes of checking identification, checking for outstanding
warrants, or making a nonsearch examination of the suspect's person, vehicle, or other possessions.
See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 9.2(1), at 375-80 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1993).
118. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 710 (1983).
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able from an arrest, not because he was detained for an unreasonable
period, but because he was forcibly moved to a private police interrogation room 119 and because the object of the detention-to confirm the officers' suspicion that Royer was carrying drugs in his luggage-was not
pursued in the most "expeditious way." 120
Royer was decided prior to Beheler and Berkemer. After Beheler
and Berkemer, three cases followed in quick succession. In United States
v. Sharpe, 121 the Court confirmed Royer's assertion that no definitive
time limit will be imposed on nonarrest detentions; 122 instead, a court
must examine the reasons why the officers detained the suspect and determine whether the length of time the officers used to "confirm or dispel" their suspicions was reasonable. 123 The Sharpe decision also
119. Royer's compelled movement to the small room off the concourse was more intrusive than
necessary under the circumstances because factors other than safety concerns-the desire to secure
his consent to a search of his luggage-prompted the officers' actions. Royer, 460 U.S. at 504-05.
120. /d. at 505-06.
121. 470 U.S. 675 (1985). A DEA agent, accompanied by a state trooper, stopped two vehicles
driven, respectively, by Sharpe and Savage. Id. at 677-78. Following a brief chase of the two vehicles, during which Savage took evasive action to avoid the officers, the DEA agent stopped Sharpe,
and, some distance away, the state trooper stopped Savage. /d. at 678. The DEA agent who stopped
Sharpe radioed for assistance and, after other officers arrived, went to the area where the state
trooper had detained Savage. /d. Prior to the time the DEA agent arrived, the state trooper, with
his gun drawn, approached Savage, ordered him to get out of the vehicle and assume a "spread
eagle" position, and frisked him. Id. In response to the trooper's request for license and registration, Savage produced his own driver's license and a bill of sale for the vehicle bearing the name
Pavlovich. In response to the trooper's questions concerning ownership of the vehicle, Savage responded that the vehicle belonged to a friend and that he was taking it to have its shock absorbers
fixed. The trooper then informed Savage that he would have to wait for the arrival of the DEA agent
and was not free to leave. /d. at 678-79. The DEA agent arrived approximately 15 minutes after
Savage was stopped. /d. at 679. The agent informed Savage that he suspected Savage's vehicle was
loaded with marijuana and twice sought Savage's permission to search the vehicle. Savage declined
to give permission to search. /d. The DEA agent then put his foot on the rear of the vehicle and
confirmed that it was heavily loaded. He also put his nose against the rear of the vehicle and concluded that he could smell marijuana. The agent obtained the keys to the vehicle, opened it, and
discovered marijuana. /d. Savage was then arrested. /d. Approximately 20 minutes elapsed between the time Savage was first stopped and the time of his arrest. See id. at 683. After placing
Savage under arrest, the DEA agent returned to the area where Sharpe was being detained. /d. at
679. Approximately 30 to 40 minutes had elapsed from the time Sharpe had first been detained. /d.
The issue in the case was the legality of Savage's 20-minute detention-the period from the time
Savage was stopped until the time when the DEA agent obtained probable cause to search by confirming the overloaded condition of the vehicle and detecting the odor of marijuana. /d. at 683.
122. /d. at 685. The court of appeals had based its suppression ruling solely on the duration of
the detention, finding that the detention "failed to meet the requirement of brevity." Sharpe v.
United States, 660 F.2d 967, 970 (4th Cir. 1981), a.ffd on reh'g, 712 F.2d 65 (1983).
123. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. The Court found that the officers pursued their investigation in a
diligent and reasonable manner. The Court approved the actions of the DEA agent in attempting to
get other officers quickly to the scene to control Sharpe while he went to the aid of the state trooper
who had stopped Savage and the DEA agent's quick actions in dealing with Savage once he arrived
at the location where Savage had been detained. /d. at 687. The Court also noted that the state
trooper could not be faulted for detaining Savage until the DEA agent arrived because the trooper
had neither specific knowledge concerning why the DEA agent was suspicious of Savage's conduct
nor general training and experience in dealing with suspected drug traffickers. /d. n.5. Finally, the
Court stated that Savage was in part responsible for the lengthy delay because he failed to stop when
the officers first sought to stop Savage and Sharpe and was finally stopped some distance from where
the DEA agent stopped Sharpe. /d. at 687-88.
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confirmed Royer's requirement that the police pursue the least intrusive
means available to confirm or dispel their suspicions, but in deciding
whether a less intrusive means was available, a court should not engage
in "unrealistic second-guessing" and should invalidate a detention only
when the officers unreasonably failed to recognize a more expeditious
alternative. 124
In Hayes v. Florida, 125 the Court reaffirmed its earlier holdings that
the forcible movement of the suspect to the station house for further investigation, such as fingerprinting, 126 exceeds the authority conferred by
Terry. The Court held that investigative practices during the period of a
Terry stop can "qualitatively and quantitatively be so intrusive with respect to a suspect's freedom of movement and privacy interests as to trigger the full protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." 127
124. ld. at 686-87. As the Court said, "[a] creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of
police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the
police might have been accomplished." ld. "The question is not simply whether some other alternative was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or to pursue it."
Id. at 687. One authority has described Sharpe as a case providing evidence that the "Court has
little interest in constitutional checks on police discretion." Maclin, supra note 32, at 1317.
125. 470 u.s. 811 (1985).
126. Hayes was one of 30 or 40 suspects in a series of burglary-rapes. Id. at 812. Fingerprints
of the assailant were found at the scene of one of the crimes. For reasons not disclosed on the
record, the police went to Hayes's home to obtain his fingerprints. I d. They planned to arrest him if
he was uncooperative. When Hayes refused to accompany them to the station house, one of the
officers explained that they were going to arrest him. At that point, Hayes "blurted out" that he
would rather go with them than be arrested. Jd. Hayes was taken to the police station and fingerprinted. When the police determined that his prints matched those found at the crime scene, Hayes
was placed under formal arrest. ld. at 813. The Florida District Court of Appeals expressly found
that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Hayes until after they obtained Hayes's fingerprints, but admitted the fingerprint evidence, holding that the process was analogous to a Terry stop
and was supported by reasonable suspicion. Jd.
127. ld. at 815-16 (emphasis added); see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) ("The
Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all contact between the police and citizens, but is designed
'to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.'" (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554
(1976))).
In Hayes, the Court held that the "full protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments"
is applicable and that the "line" between reasonable and unreasonable seizures "is crossed when the
police, without probable cause or a warrant, forcibly remove a person from his home or other place
in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station, where he is detained, although
briefly, for investigative purposes." Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816. According to the Court, such seizures,
at least in the absence of judicial supervision, "are sufficiently like arrests to invoke the traditional
rule that arrests may constitutionally be made only on probable cause.'' Id.
The Court relied heavily on Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), a case remarkably similar
on its facts. In Davis, without probable cause, the police took the suspect to the station house, where
he was fingerprinted and briefly questioned before being released. ld. at 722. The Court held that
the detention exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry stop, even though, as the Court specifically
recognized, the intrusion on personal security was minimal. ld. at 727-28.
The Hayes decision also relied on Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), a case in which
the police, without probable cause, brought the suspect to the station house for questioning. ld. at
203. The Court held that "detention for custodial interrogation-regardless of its label-intrudes so
severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional
safeguards against illegal arrest.'' Id. at 216.
Hayes and Davis, read together, suggest that the movement of the suspect, not the investigative
objectives pursued, turned the detention into a de facto arrest. Hayes specifically alluded to the

400

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol 1993

The most important post-Beheler/Berkemer case, however, is
United States v. Hensley. 128 In Hensley, the Court held that the permissible uses of a Terry stop include nonarrest detentions for investigation of
completed crimes. 129 More importantly, however, Hensley held that for
Fourth Amendment purposes, a detention will be characterized according to the actual circumstances of the detention and without regard to
the subjective intent of the police or, apparently, the subjective or reasonable perceptions of the suspect. "[W]hat matters," according to the
Court, "is that the stop and detention that occurred were in fact no more
intrusive than would have been permitted [in a Terry stop]." 130
possibility that a "brief detention in the field for the purpose of fingerprinting" would be permissible
based simply on reasonable suspicion. 470 U.S. at 816-17. The Court's reference, therefore, to
Hayes's "privacy interests" is inexplicable. Dunaway, on the other hand, emphasized the intrusive
nature of the objective pursued--custodial interrogation-as the factor that turned the detention
into a de facto arrest. 442 U.S. at 212.
The true basis for Dunaway is difficult to discern. In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692
( 1981 ), the Court sustained the temporary detention of the occupant of a dwelling that was about to
be searched under the authority of a warrant, holding that the mere connection of the occupant to
the dwelling justified the detention. In Summers, although the Court distinguished such a detention
from that condemned in Dunaway on the ground that the seizure in Dunaway was "designed to
provide an opportunity for interrogation," whereas in Summers, the detention was "not likely to
have the coercive aspects likely to induce self-incrimination," id. at 702 n.15, the Court also noted
that, in Summers, "because the detention ... was in (the suspect's) own residence, it could add only
minimally to the public stigma associated with the search itself and would involve neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a compelled visit to the police station." /d. at 702.
128. 469 U.S. 221 (1985). Hensley, while driving his automobile, was stopped by police officers
based on a "wanted flyer" issued by another department. /d. at 223-34. The police approached the
vehicle with weapons drawn but pointed in the air. /d. at 224. Hensley and a passenger in the
vehicle were ordered to step out of the car. /d. The police discovered several guns in the automobile, and Hensley, a convicted felon, was convicted of possession of firearms. /d. at 224-25. The
Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction, finding that the police lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity based solely on the "wanted flyer" and that, in any event, Terry was confined to investigative
stops on less than probable cause in settings involving the investigation of "ongoing crimes." 713
F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 1983).
129. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 227. The Court acknowledged that all of its prior Terry stop cases
involved suspicion that the accused was about to commit a crime, but stressed dicta in several cases
suggesting that the Terry doctrine could be applied to cases involving the detention of persons suspected of past criminal activity. /d. The Court further held that nonarrest detentions for completed
crimes could be based on less than probable cause and that the reasonableness of such detentions
would be determined by balancing the "nature and quality of the intrusion" against the importance
of the law enforcement interests alleged to justify the intrusion. /d. at 228. In the balance, the Court
recognized that nonarrest detentions for completed crimes do not implicate crime prevention interests, do not involve the same exigencies, do not normally involve the same public safety concerns,
and do not normally involve the same limits on choosing the time and circumstances of the detention. /d. at 228-29. Nonetheless, the Court also noted that extension of Terry to detentions for
completed crimes "promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders
to justice." /d. at 229. The Court concluded, therefore, that the "law enforcement interests at stake
... outweigh the individual's interest to be free of a stop and detention that is no more extensive than
permissible in the investigation of imminent or ongoing crimes." /d. This aspect of Hensley has
been criticized. See Robert B. Harper, Has the Replacement of "Probable Cause" with "Reasonable
Suspicion" Resulted in the Creation of the Best of All Possible Worlds?, 22 AKRON L. REV. 13, 33-42
(1988).
130. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 234-35. The characterization of the detention in Hensley was particularly difficult given the unusual circumstances leading to the stop. Hensley was detained initially
based on the "wanted flyer" issued by another police department. The "flyer" asked that Hensley be
detained and held. /d. at 235. No arrest warrant, however, had been issued. The Court held that a
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The Court's nonarrest detention decisions-Royer, Sharpe, Hayes,
and Hensley-taken together suggest that the Fourth Amendment values
that inform the distinction between stops and arrests include factors
other than simply the length of the detention. Clearly the paramount
Fourth Amendment value implicated when the government deprives a
citizen of his or her freedom of movement-seizes the person-is the
length of the detention. The Fourth Amendment limits the government's
authority to control the movement of people, including both the power to
detain suspects as well as the power to compel their movement. The
longer the detention or the greater the compelled movement, 131 the
greater the infringement on Fourth Amendment interests. Thus, the
mere fact that the suspect is detained other than "temporarily" 132 or the
mere fact that the suspect is forced to move, especially when he or she is
moved to an isolated setting, 133 invokes the most stringent of Fourth
police officer acts reasonably in making a detention in objective reliance on a flyer or bulletin issued
on the basis of articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion that the accused has committed a
crime. /d. at 232. Objective reliance on the wanted flyer will support a brief detention to check for
identification, to pose questions, or to obtain further information, such as whether an arrest warrant
has been issued. /d. One authority has described the Court's treatment of the significance of the
flyer as a "threat to the warrant requirement." Maclin, supra note 32, at 1314.
If the detention is made on objective reliance on the flyer or bulletin, evidence uncovered during
the course of the detention will be admissible. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 233. In Hensley, the Court found
that the department issuing the flyer had at least reasonable suspicion of Hensley's involvement in a
robbery. /d. At the time Hensley was detained, the officers knew only that other departments were
checking to determine if a warrant had been issued. /d. at 224. "Moments" after the initial detention, the police observed the butt of a revolver protruding from under the passenger's seat. /d. The
Court concluded that it was irrelevant whether the officers intended to detain Hensley for some
longer period or only long enough to determine whether a warrant had been issued. What mattered,
said the Court, was that, prior to the time probable cause to arrest arose as a result of sighting the
firearm, Hensley was detained only briefly upon reasonable suspicion and the detention was no more
intrusive than would have been permitted had the detention been made by the department that
issued the flyer. /d. at 235-36.
The Court did not mention how Hensley or a reasonable person in Hensley's position might
have perceived his circumstances. One authority has suggested that the absence of concern for the
perception of the suspect is attributable to the fact that the parties did not address the issue in their
briefs. Dix, supra note 45, at 935.
131. But see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam). In Mimms, the defendant was detained in a routine traffic stop and ordered to get out of his vehicle. /d. at 107. When the
defendant emerged from the vehicle, the officer noticed a large bulge, frisked the defendant, and
found a weapon. /d. The Court held that the additional intrusion occasioned by the command to
the defendant to get out of the vehicle was "de minimis." /d. at Ill. The Court further held that
the officer's conduct did not constitute a "'serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person' " and
was not significant enough to rise to the "level of a "'petty indignity.""' Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. I, 17 (1968)).
132. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983) ("[W]e have never approved a seizure
of the person for [a 90-minute period]").
133. The forcible movement of the suspect to a squad car is a factor to weigh in determining
whether a detention constitutes a de facto arrest. See United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 377
(4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985); United States v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262,
1266-67 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 914 (1981); see also United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d
368, 371-72 (8th Cir. 1989) (discussing fact that suspect was moved to an isolated setting away from
his normal work station); United States v. Baron, 860 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1988) (examining
circumstances in which suspect was moved to a bedroom where the curtains were drawn shut), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1040 (1989). But see United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 599-600 (5th Cir.)
(holding that the movement of a suspect from a bus to a building maintained by law enforcement
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Amendment protections-the requirement of probable cause.
Freedom of movement in its broadest sense, however, is not the only
Fourth Amendment value implicated when a person is seized. The
Court's nonarrest detention decisions recognize that a detention may enhance evidence gathering objectives and therefore that the standards governing seizures must reflect concern for the individual's privacy rights. 134
Nonarrest detentions may become de facto arrests simply because the
police engage in numerous and intrusive evidence-gathering activities
during the period of a brief detention. 135
If a nonarrest detention can be transformed into a de facto arrest
simply because the investigative techniques employed exceeded those reasonably necessary given the circumstances that prompted the detention
or because the police exercised authority to move the suspect, then the
Fourth Amendment values implicated by a seizure must include concern
for privacy interests. The character of a seizure, therefore, is a factor not
just of time and space but also the ability of the government, given its
ability to control the suspect's movement, to subject the suspect to intrusive evidence-gathering activities. Although the Fourth Amendment
may not directly limit the ability of the government to investigate a suspect, it indirectly affects the nature and scope of investigations by limiting the government's ability to compel a person's physical presence at
any particular moment and at any particular location. More importantly, the Fourth Amendment also limits the ability of the government
to investigate a suspect on less than probable cause by limiting the investigative techniques that can be employed when a suspect has been detained on less than probable cause. 136
personnel did not, under the circumstances, transform the detention into a de facto arrest), cert.

denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988).
134. In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), the Supreme Court upheld the right of the
police to detain the occupants of a dwelling during the period a search warrant is executed, finding
that the mere connection of the person to the dwelling is enough to constitute reasonable suspicion
for a detention. /d. at 703-04. The Court specifically noted that the detention under these circumstances "is not likely to be exploited by the officer or unduly prolonged in order to gain more information, because the information the officers seek normally will be obtained through the search and
not through the detention." /d. at 70 I.
135. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983) (plurality opinion).
136. The range of investigative activities that require physical contact with, and control over,
the suspect include, in addition to questioning, fingerprinting, see Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811,
813-14 (1985); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969), lineups or showups, see United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 219-20 (1967), obtaining urine or blood samples, Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966), nail
scrapings, see Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1973), or other incriminating evidence from
the body, see Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1985), obtaining voice or handwriting samples,
see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I, 13-14 (1973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 22
(1973), and requiring the suspect to move, wear clothing, or speak, see Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496
U.S. 582, 585 (1990); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910); Farmer v. Commonwealth,
404 S.E.2d 371, 372-73 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (en bane), or to be photographed, see United States v.
Greene, 722 F. Supp. 1221, 1224 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
The individual from whom such evidence is sought receives no protection from the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment protects an accused only
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The stop and frisk decisions also confirm that the "intrusiveness" of
the "means" by which a nonarrest detention is effectuated requires consideration of qualitative as well as quantitative factors surrounding the
seizure. Assessing the reasonableness of a seizure requires balancing the
extent of the intrusion against the need for it, as well as considering the
manner in which it is conducted. 137 Just as killing a fleeing felony suspect under certain conditions may constitute an unreasonable means of
seizing a person, so too would the use of excessive force or other
debilitating tactics-such as handcuffing 138-during the period of a
nonarrest detention. The Fourth Amendment values inherent in the proscription against unreasonable seizures include concern for personal
safety and human dignity. When the police possess probable cause to
believe the suspect has committed a crime, the use of reasonable force
commensurate with the objective of the seizure-indeterminate loss of
freedom-is authorized, and the individual's interest in liberty or freedom of movement is subordinate and will remain so for an indefinite
period. But when the police possess only reasonable suspicion that the
suspect has committed a crime, the objective of the seizure-determinate
loss of freedom-is limited. Although the Court has held that reasonable
force may be used to effectuate a seizure 139 and that the suspect's liberty
or freedom of movement is subordinate during the period of determinate
seizure, 140 the individual so detained still possesses the inchoate right to
an immediate restoration of liberty or freedom of movement absent disclosure of additional incriminating information. Because the level of suspicion required to support a Terry stop is less than that required to
support an arrest and because the range of permissible activity is limited,
the tactics and force applied to effectuate a Terry stop likewise must be
limited.
Terry gave the government the right to make a temporary detention
of a suspect on less than probable cause. Its progeny suggest, however,
that if either the manner of effectuating the nonarrest detention or the
investigative means employed during the period of the nonarrest detention mirror those that lawfully could be employed only if a lawful arrest
has occurred, the detention will be treated as a de facto arrest for Fourth
Amendment purposes.
from being compelled to provide evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. Doe v. United
States, 487 U.S. 201, 215 (1988).
137. Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
138. See United States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821, 824-25 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Blum, 614 F.2d 537,
539-40 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bourassa, 411 F.2d 69, 71-72 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 915 (1969); United States v. Miller, 722 F. Supp. l, 5 (W.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. CorralCorral, 702 F. Supp. 1539, 1544-45 (D. Wyo. 1988); United States v. Guarino, 629 F. Supp. 320, 324
(D. Conn. 1986).
139. See Gamer, 471 U.S. at 7-8. But see Dix, supra note 45, at 906 (..complete fourth amendment prohibition against the use of deadly force to make investigatory stops may be appropriate").
140. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235-36 (1985).
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THE LIMITS OF SHARED VALUES

As the above discussion demonstrates, presumptive equation of Miranda's concept of custody with the Fourth Amendment concept of
arrest, actual or de facto, has obvious practical and analytical appeal.
The Fifth Amendment concept of custody and the Fourth Amendment
concept of arrest advance, at least in part, compatible interests. Both are
premised, to a greater or lesser extent, on the assumption that significant
restraints on freedom of movement implicate constitutional values beyond those inherent in the mere loss of freedom of movement. In the
case of the Fifth Amendment, significant custodial restraints produce a
form of prohibited compulsion to speak when questioned. In the case of
the Fourth Amendment, significant custodial restraints maximize the
government's evidence gathering potential.
Although the values that inform the concepts of custody and arrest
are closely aligned, the analogy is not perfect. Miranda's concept of custody is predicated upon the belief that significant custodial restraints produce, in the mind of the suspect, a form of prohibited compulsion. 141
The suspect's state of mind, real or attributed, provides the factual predicate for the assumption that compulsion exists when a suspect is in custody. Miranda makes little sense if, in deciding whether a suspect is in
custody, no attempt is made to view the situation as it might appear to a
reasonable person.
On the other hand, when the issue is whether a suspect was subjected to a Terry-type nonarrest detention or instead was arrested, the
real or attributed state of mind of the suspect is not important, given the
values that inform the distinction between the two forms of seizure. 142
When a seizure has occurred and the issue is whether the seizure is a
nonarrest detention or a de facto arrest, the suspect's state of mind is
irrelevant to the advancement of legitimate Fourth Amendment values.
The Fourth Amendment, as a check against unlawful arrests, guarantees
freedom of movement and the attendant privacy rights accompanying
141. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
142. When the issue is whether the suspect has been seized (as opposed to the type of seizure
involved), however, the state of mind of the suspect may be important in advancing Fourth Amendment values. If a suspect could, given the circumstances, reasonably believe he or she was not free to
leave, the suspect may decide not to test the government's intent; thus, whether seized or not, the
suspect may not attempt to leave, thereby allowing the government the advantage of a de facto
seizure based upon a reasonable person's natural inclination to cooperate and not test the limits of
government authority. Application of the reasonable person test, however, has been criticized. See
Butterfoss, supra note 30, at 439 ("[G]iven the reality that citizens virtually never feel free to walk
away from an encounter initiated by a police officer, most of the citizens in these 'nonseizure' encounters do not feel free to walk away.").
A seizure occurs, therefore, when, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have
believed he or she was not free to leave, INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984), or not free "to
disregard the police and go about his business," California v. Hodari D., Ill S. Ct. 1547, 1552
(1991); see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
The reasonable person standard, however, "presupposes an innocent person." Florida v. Bostick, Ill S. Ct. 2382, 2388 (1991); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 519 n.4 (1983) (Biackmun, J., dissenting).
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the right to control locomotion until such time as the government advances sufficient justification-probable cause-for limiting those freedoms. The Fourth Amendment's guarantee that we will not be arrested
in the absence of probable cause, like its guarantee that our papers,
houses, and effects will not be searched or seized in the absence of probable cause, operates as a check against unreasonable actions by law enforcement officials; it does not protect against psychic trauma associated
with the possibility-unrealized-that our person, papers, houses, and
effects might be searched or seized. A search of our papers, houses, and
effects occurs when, but only when, the police actually invade our privacy; the Fourth Amendment is not violated simply because we believe,
perhaps reasonably so, that our houses, papers, and effects are about to
be searched or seized, or both.
Similar reasoning applies to the law of arrests. A lawful Terry stop
is not rendered unreasonable simply because the suspect believes he or
she has been arrested or is uncertain as to his or her fate during the
period of the temporary detention. Anxiety-a detained suspect's fear of
what might happen following a lawful detention-simply is not a value
recognized by the Fourth Amendment. When a suspect has been detained, the only issue is what actually happens to the suspect-the nature
and quality of his or her detention. 143 Objective factors therefore properly inform the issue of whether an arrest has occurred. 144
Because the concepts of custody and arrest are not aligned perfectly,
one subtle yet potentially outcome-determinative difference between the
two must be recognized and implemented. The determination whether a
detention, because of the circumstances, crossed the threshold and became a de facto arrest for Miranda, but not for Fourth Amendment purposes, must be made with reference to the likely perception of a
reasonable person. Berkemer's command that Miranda requires such an
inquiry 145 must be given full force.
Two examples will demonstrate when the divergence between Miranda's concept of custody and the Fourth Amendment's concept of
143. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. l, 8 (1985). One authority has argued, however, that "experiencing a twenty minute detention may ... be made substantially more intrusive if the detainee
believes throughout this period that the detention is the initial stage of an arrest with its prolonged
period of detention and increased risk of prosecution." Dix, supra note 45, at 922. A focus on what
happens to a suspect, as opposed to what the suspect thought, perhaps reasonably so, might happen,
does not mean that subjective concerns are wholly irrelevant. To a greater or lesser extent, intangible concerns, such as fear and surprise, are present in most seizures. See Michigan Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 494 U.S. 444, 452-53 (1990); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558
(1976). Intangible concerns-fear, surprise, embarrassment, or humiliation-are consequences of a
seizure and cannot be eliminated in the absence of a requirement that the police inform everyone, at
the outset of a seizure, of the precise nature of the detention.
144. The "post-hoc" mode of analysis has been criticized on two grounds. First, the analysis
does not attach a penalty to detentions on less than probable cause when the police fully intend an
unlimited detention or intend to utilize impermissible investigative techniques. Second, judicial review will be most meaningful if it is made on the same basis as the actions taken. See Dix, supra
note 45, at 921-22.
145. 468 u.s. 420, 442 (1984).
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arrest could be outcome determinative. In Case One, upon reasonable
suspicion a suspect is detained for a brief period in a manner that otherwise clearly would constitute a nonarrest detention for Fourth Amendment purposes, except that the detaining officer informs the suspect that
he is "under arrest." Assuming that Hensley's post-hoc mode of analysis146 would not require a finding of a de facto arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes simply because the suspect was told he was "under
arrest," 147 the suspect nonetheless must be deemed in custody for Miranda purposes. The Miranda decision, grounded as it is in the inherently compelling environment of custodial questioning, virtually compels
a finding that the suspect, clearly seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and informed that he is "under arrest," should receive the Miranda
warnings. Although the mere fact that the suspect was told that he was
"under arrest" does not, in itself, implicate Fourth Amendment values
beyond those implicated by the very fact of the lawful nonarrest detention, the communication of the fact of arrest would have a profound effect on a reasonable person's view of the circumstances of custodial
questioning that might follow. To ignore the consequences of communication of the fact of arrest in such a case would strike adversely at the
very predicate for the Miranda decision. As the Court stated in
Berkemer, Miranda should be "enforced strictly, but only in those types
of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are
implicated." 148
In Case Two, a suspect is detained under circumstances that, employing Hensley's post-hoc mode of analysis, constitute a valid nonarrest
detention. The suspect's vehicle is stopped upon reasonable suspicion
that it contains contraband. The stop is achieved when a uniformed officer (in a police car with lights flashing) catches the suspect's speeding
vehicle. The officer approaches the vehicle with his revolver drawn and
orders the suspect out of the vehicle. The officer further orders the suspect to assume a "spread eagle" position. Following a Terry frisk for
weapons, the officer asks the suspect for his driver's license and vehicle
registration. The suspect produces his own valid license and a bill of sale
for the vehicle in the name of another. In response to questions concerning ownership of the vehicle, the suspect states that it belongs to a friend.
The officer informs the suspect that he will be detained until the arrival
146. See supra notes 128-30, 142-46 and accompanying text.
147. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 117, § 9.2(e), at 373 ("The point is that despite the contemporaneous characterization by the officer, he in fact did no more than he was authorized to do by Terry in
terms of the length and locale of the seizure and the extent of the incidental search."); LaFave, supra
note 20, at 427-28 (arguing that the characterization of a detention should be made by examining
"what the officer did rather than what he said"); see also Downs v. State, 570 A.2d 1142, 1144 (Del.
1990) (stating that "words cannot transform a mere 'stop' into an 'arrest'"); People v. Stevens, 517
P.2d 1336, 1339 (Colo. 1973) (en bane) (stating that the fact that police told defendants they were
under arrest does not necessarily mean defendants were under arrest for Fourth Amendment
purposes).
148. 486 U.S. at 437.
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of a narcotics officer. At that point, the suspect becomes nervous, indicates that he wants to leave, and requests the return of his license. The
officer tells the suspect that he is not free to leave. Fifteen minutes later,
the narcotics officer arrives and informs the suspect that he believes the
vehicle contains contraband. The narcotics officer twice asks the suspect
for permission to search the vehicle. Both times, the suspect declines.
The narcotics officer then steps on the rear of the vehicle and, when it
does not move, concludes that it is overloaded. The officer puts his nose
against the trunk and states that he smells marijuana. When the suspect
is asked directly whether the vehicle contains marijuana, he responds,
"It's not mine. I was just carrying it for a friend." The narcotics officer
opens the trunk and finds a large quantity of marijuana.
The facts of Case Two are, in essence, the facts of United States v.
Sharpe, 149 except that in Sharpe no questioning of the suspect occurred
before the marijuana was discovered. In Sharpe, the only issue presented
was the legality of the detention prior to the discovery of the drugs. The
Supreme Court concluded that the suspect was validly detained upon
reasonable suspicion until such point as the narcotics officer detected the
odor of marijuana and that the search of the vehicle was, therefore, not a
"fruit" of a prior illegal detention.
Assuming arguendo that the Fourth Amendment issue presented is
properly resolved in the government's favor employing the post-hoc
mode of analysis, the issue remains whether the questioning of the suspect is permissible in the absence of Miranda warnings. If the issue of
custody is determined as Beheler commands with reference to the likely
state of mind of the suspect, this suspect surely would have felt the type
of compelling environment described in Miranda. This suspect was forcibly detained by two officers. Firearms were displayed, and the suspect
was frisked. He was informed that a narcotics officer had been called to
the scene and that he was not free to leave. He was detained under these
circumstances for fifteen minutes and, upon the arrival of a narcotics
officer, was asked to consent to a search of the vehicle. Finally, he was
specifically accused of driving a vehicle that the police suspected-confirmed by the odor-contained marijuana and asked directly whether the
vehicle contained marijuana. A more compelling environment outside
Miranda's paradigm station house interrogation is difficult to envision.
The use of a test for custody that focuses on the perception of a
reasonable suspect under the circumstances is more than a semantic exercise. It is true, of course, that the reasonable perception approach requires a court to place itself in the position of the suspect and attempt to
discern how a typical person would view his or her condition. The reality, of course, is that suspects would react differently and that no single
state of mind can be attributed to all suspects confronted with similar
circumstances. The reasonable person approach, however, is desirable
149.

470 U.S. 675 (1985); see supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
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and defensible not because of its factual accuracy but because it is the
approach that most closely approximates the factual and legal predicates
for the Miranda decision. We evaluate Fourth Amendment stop/arrest
issues utilizing a post-hoc mode of analysis because the detained suspect's
perception of his status is irrelevant to the full implementation of the
Fourth Amendment values implicated by his detention. 150 The characterization of a detention is determined by what happens to the suspect,
not what he or she believes might happen. What is important for Fourth
Amendment purposes is what actually transpires during the period of the
nonarrest detention. Is he or she forcibly subdued and restrained? Is he
or she detained for a substantial period of time? Is he or she subjected to
extensive and intrusive evidence gathering techniques?
When the issue is, however, whether the detained suspect needs the
prophylactic safeguards mandated by Miranda, the suspect's actual or
presumed state of mind is of critical importance. In fact, Miranda makes
little sense unless the focus is on the suspect's actual or presumed state of
mind. Thus, use of the reasonable perception standard for purposes of
determining Miranda's concept of custody is defensible even though the
use of that standard may produce cases where the police will be required
to administer warnings to a suspect merely detained in a nonarrest situation upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
V.

CONCLUSION

The relationship between the Fourth Amendment values that inform the distinction between stops and arrests and the Fifth Amendment
values that inform Miranda's concept of custody, although not symbiotic, is such that it is both intellectually defensible and logical to presume
that a suspect detained in a routine nonarrest detention-a Terry stop-may be questioned without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Both constitutional concepts, to a greater or lesser extent, focus on the means used
by the police to achieve their objectives, both limit the scope of the government's permissible evidence gathering techniques, and both require
characterization of a forcible detention. Moreover, the wholesale injection of Miranda based logic into the investigative practice known as stop
and frisk significantly would undermine the function of such detentions
and well might place demands on the criminal justice system-the need
for counsel-that would be impossible to fulfill. lSI
Reconciliation of Miranda with the circumstances attendant to stop
and frisk activity is difficult because the constitutional validation of the
investigative technique known as stop and frisk occurred after Miranda
was decided. The Miranda decision, therefore, understandably did not
address the need for warnings in the context of a nonarrest detention.
Accommodation of Miranda with the stop and frisk doctrine therefore
150.
151.

See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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was a necessary step, and Berkemer provided a workable framework for
the resolution of the issue. Although Berkemer tempts courts to conclude that Miranda warnings never are required during the period of a
Terry-type nonarrest detention, such a categorical reading of Berkemer is
erroneous and would produce a restrictive and indefensible limitation on
Miranda that would undermine significantly both the legal and factual
predicates for the Miranda decision. Berkemer's equation of the concepts of custody and arrest is presumptive only. Moreover, in defining
the concept of arrest, whether for Fourth Amendment purposes or for
purposes of determining Miranda's concept of custody, courts must be
sensitive to the full range of Fourth Amendment values implicated when
a person is seized and must not simply look to the spatial and temporal
aspects of the detention. Finally, courts must recognize that the standard employed for the resolution of Miranda's custody issue in nonarrest
detention cases must be made from the perspective of how a reasonable
person under the circumstances would have viewed his or her position at
the time of questioning.

